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Abstract In a series of papers, Asbjørn Steglich-Peterson (2008, 2011) and Nick Zangwill (2005, 2010) 
argue that since propositional attitude (PA) ascription judgments do not behave like normative judgments 
in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be 
constitutively normative. This paper argues that for a specific version of normativism, according to which 
PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, it is first argued that despite their close 
connection, commitments and obligations should be kept apart. Then it is shown that the intuitions allegedly 
governing all normative judgments do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgments, 
including PA-ascription judgments conceived as such. Therefore, these constraints should be constrained 
to exclude this group of normative judgments. 
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1.  Introduction 
Several philosophers have claimed that propositional attitudes (PAs), like beliefs and intentions, 
are essentially or constitutively normative.2 By this, they generally mean that some norms, specifically 
norms of rationality, should be essentially involved in characterizing the nature of these mental states. For 
example, it is in the nature of belief that believing P is correct iff P is true, or that somebody believing P 
should believe its implication if she happens to give any verdict on this, and it is in the nature of intention 
that intending to P essentially requires intending the necessary means to P. Let’s call this view ‘PA 
normativism’. Irrespective of how this idea may be cashed out, if PAs are essentially or constitutively 
normative, and it is reflected in their concepts that they are so, then PA-ascription judgments (PAAJ for 
short), like ‘he believes that P’, or ‘I intend to P’ would be normative judgments. As Gibbard (2003) puts 
it: “when I attribute mental content—when I say, for instance, that Ebenezer is thinking that he has lost his 
keys—I’m somehow speaking oughts” (p. 85). Starting from this observation, Asbjørn Steglich-Peterson 
(2008, 2011) and Nick Zangwill (2005, 2010) show that PAAJs are not subject to some robust intuitions 
governing normative thought in general. Having done so, they conclude that PAAJs cannot be normative 
and, therefore, PAs are not constitutively normative. This is, as far as it goes, a good strategy to determine 
whether a group of judgments, not obviously normative, are ultimately normative or not.  Suppose that 
something new is discovered. In order to determine whether it is an instance of an entity already known or 
not, the best way is to check whether the characteristic features of the entity in question apply to this new 
thing or not. One of the advantages of this argument is that it does not presuppose any specific conception 
of norms in force for PAs. Whether such norms are conceived as deontic or evaluative (Fassio  2011, 
McHugh 2012), first-personal or third-personal (Hlobil 2015), as long as PAAJs are normative judgments, 
this argument works well. 
 
1 Sharif University of Technology (SUT), Iran: ark0069@gmail.com  
2 This thesis has recently been defended by Ralph Wedgwood (2011), Alan Millar (2004), Akeel Bilgrami (2004), Paul 
Boghossian (2003), Alan Gibbard (2003), and Nishi Shah and David Velleman (2005), among others. 
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The widely held intuitions that Steglich-Peterson and Zangwill appeal to are a priori normative 
supervenience and what Zangwill (2006) has called the Because Constraint (p. 275).3 These are well-
respected norms governing normative thought which relate the normative judgments to the non-normative 
ones. From the observation that PAAJs seem not to be governed by these intuitions, it is concluded that 
PAs cannot be normative states; they are either non-normative states with no necessary relation to normative 
properties (Steglich-Peterson 2008), or non-normative states which essentially consequentially relate to 
normative requirements (Zangwill 2005, pp. 6-7). To face this line of thought, PA normativists can either 
try to argue that PAAJs are, after all, subject to such intuitions, properly understood (Laurier 2011), or they 
may show that these intuitions do not hold for all normative judgments.4 In this paper, I grant that these 
principles do not apply to PAAJs, so the former proposal will not be considered here.5 For the latter strategy 
to be successful, of course, we cannot directly claim that PAAJs are exceptions or counterexamples to these 
intuitions, because this would be clearly question-begging. A more promising approach is to show that 
some uncontroversially normative judgments are not subject to these intuitions and then to show that there 
is a plausible account of PA normativism which precisely construes PAAJs in terms of this kind of 
normative judgment. It is this strategy which is pursued here. In particular, it will be argued that thinking 
of PAs as a special kind of commitment, though clearly a version of normativism, has the advantage of 
matching our intuitions regarding the PAAJs, as well as their divergences from other normative judgments 
regarding these constraints.6 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the intuitions allegedly governing all normative 
judgments and shows how PAAJs diverge from them. Section 3 deals with the attitude-as-commitment 
model. The distinctness of this view from other versions of normativism is not sufficiently appreciated in 
the literature: this is because commitment is usually treated as just a different way of speaking about 
obligations and, as such, its distinguishing features are levelled away. Section 4 addresses this issue and 
shows that the logic of commitment is interestingly different from the logic of obligations. Having done so, 
section 5 shows how and why the intuitions discussed in section 2 do not govern commitment-attributing 
judgments. I finish the paper with a brief conclusion. 
2. Divide and Conquer 
What are the a priori intuitions governing normative judgments? The first one is a priori normative 
supervenience. According to this, necessarily two objects/properties/persons that are identical in their non-
normative respects, are identical in their normative respects as well. A priori supervenience is, therefore, a 
coherence constraint. If, for example, this action is damn good, and there is another action which is exactly 
 
3 This is also sometimes called ‘dependence constraint’, see for example Roberts 2017, p. 197. 
4 Note that if the PAs’ essential normativity was only known a posteriori, in the same sense that water is essentially 
H2O a posteriori, the fact that PAAJs are not subject to these a priori intuitions could not tell against the essential 
normativity of PAs. However, it is hard to take such a response seriously, since the main motivation be hind mental 
normativism is to stress the fact that the norms claimed to be constitutive of PAs do, in fact, contribute to the 
subject’s deliberations and actions self-consciously. Therefore, if we abandon this aspect, by holding that the 
normativity of PAs may be outside the purview of subjects applying the PA-concept, the thesis loses its initial appeal 
and “it is hard to see on what grounds anyone would want to hold it” (Laurier, 2011, p. 316, see also Steglich-
Peterson 2008, pp. 268-69, and Zangwill 2010, p. 29). 
5 For a detailed critique of this proposal, see Steglich-Peterson (2011, 340-44). 
6 Thick concepts, like kindness and rudeness, which seem to have descriptive and evaluative contents 
simultaneously, are sometimes claimed to challenge the Because Constraint (Roberts 2017) and normative  
supervenience (Roberts 2018) (see Zangwill (2017) for a critique of this idea). The kind of exception to these 
constraints defended here is, however, completely independent from that line of thought. 
This is an early draft of a paper forthcoming in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217320000098. Please cite the published version. 
 
3 
 
alike it in all non-normative respects, it would be incoherent to judge that the second action is not damn 
good (Laurier 2011, pp. 326-27). Note that this is different from any a posteriori supervenience that one 
might hold about normativity or other subject matters. It is a special feature of normative thought that there 
is a robust intuition that the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative is conceded a priori. 
Having this in mind, in the rest of the paper, I will use supervenience and a priori normative supervenience 
interchangeably.  
I follow Zangwill (2006) in calling the next constraint the Because Constraint. According to this, 
if a subject makes a normative judgment like ‘this car is damn good’, or ‘he ought to do P’, she should be 
ready to back up this judgment by a non-normative one, at least if challenged to do so (p. 270). The non-
normative judgment invoked should show the non-normative property or states of affairs in virtue or 
because of which the normative judgment holds true. Thus the Because Constraint. This dependence of 
normative judgments on non-normative ones seems to hold a priori. Namely, somebody who makes a 
normative judgment but is not ready to ground this judgment by a non-normative one seems to be confused 
about the meaning of the normative concept she is applying (Steglich-Peterson 2008, pp. 272-73). Suppose 
somebody says ‘this is terrible’, but when asked why he thinks so, he replies because this is just terrible. In 
this case our reaction would be one of surprise and confusion. There ought to be something non-normative 
making this thing terrible, and the subject making this judgment ought to appreciate this point by being 
ready to mention this ‘something’ through a non-normative judgment. 
This is unlike empirical judgments which are not usually susceptible to this constraint a priori. In 
other words, even though we usually ground our empirical judgments, it does not hold a priori that upon 
making an empirical judgment we should be ready to ground it through another judgment on pain of being 
confused about the meaning of non-normative concepts we are applying.7 Moreover, the kind of grounding 
relation we have in the Because Constraint is different from other grounding relations. As Steglich-Peterson 
(2011) stresses, a trace in the sand can ground the judgment that somebody has walked here (p. 342). But 
it doesn’t make any sense to hold that ‘somebody has walked here’ holds in virtue of the fact that there is a 
trace in the sand. Therefore, the metaphysical grounding relation that the Because Constraint requires 
should not be conflated with the evidential support and epistemic grounding that all judgments, normative 
or otherwise, need to have (Zangwill 2017, p. 230). So the Because Constraint is special both in its a priority 
and also in the specific grounding relation that it claims between the normative and non-normative facts.8 
Now suppose that PAs are constitutively normative and that this is reflected in their concepts, 
namely competency in applying PA concepts presupposes respecting their normativity. Therefore, PAAJs 
are normative judgments and they should be subject to the above-mentioned constraints. Unfortunately, 
none of these seems to be correct for PAAJs. Regarding the Because Constraint, as Steglich-Peterson (2011) 
writes:9 
 
7 I leave it open whether there is also a kind of empirical judgments which is subject to the Because Constraint 
(Zangwill 2017, p. 239). Note that nothing in the arguments of this paper rests on this. 
8 The link between these two principles is a matter of dispute. Some, like Zangwill (2006) contend that the Because 
Constraint either is or explains the supervenience (p. 273). Others, like Laurier (2011, pp. 326-27) and Steglich-
Peterson (2011, 345n7) think that these two are distinct, even though the Because  Constraint is motivated by the 
supervenience. Nevertheless, in this paper, I address the challenges that supervenience and the Because Constraint 
pose for PA normativism separately. 
9 Responding to Laurier (2011), Steglich-Peterson has slightly modified his original formulations of the arguments 
presented in Steglich-Peterson (2008). In this paper, I ignore this dialectic and stick to the latest version of his 
arguments, as presented in Steglich-Peterson (2011). 
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It is not an a priori requirement that whenever S attributes some attitude, S must be prepared 
to provide a non-normative judgment in support of it, which satisfies the conditions for 
non-normative grounding (evidential grounding which does not satisfy those conditions is 
sufficient) (p. 343).  
Unlike normative judgments, like ‘this action is despicable’, PAAJs do not require a non-normative 
grounding and are usually self-standing in this respect. One feels no conceptual pressure to ground the 
judgment ‘I believe that P’ through a non-normative judgment showing the properties in virtue of which 
this judgment holds true. PAAJs either require no ground or, when they do, they can be sufficiently 
grounded through other mental ascriptions. For example, ‘I believe that P’ can be sufficiently grounded 
through my belief that P^Q. But if PAAJs were normative, they could not play the role of a sufficient ground 
for other PAs. But since they in fact do play such a role, they are not normative judgments (Steglich-
Peterson 2011, p. 342). As already pointed out, this does not mean that there can be no evidential support 
for these judgments; things like behavioral clues and assertions (directly or indirectly expressing these 
attitudes) can, for sure, be evidence for these ascriptions and justify them. But we should distinguish 
between these evidential supports, present for all judgments, normative or otherwise, and the Because 
Constraint (Steglich-Peterson 2008, p. 274). It is only on the most implausible behaviorist account of the 
mind that these behavioral clues are considered as the grounds of PAAJs, in the sense required by the 
Because Constraint (Steglich-Peterson 2011, p. 342).  
The unruliness of PAAJs with respect to this constraint can be discovered from the opposite 
direction as well. If PAAJs were normative, then: 
they could not act as non-normative support for normative rationality judgments in a way 
that satisfies the Because Constraint. But propositional attitude ascriptions can act as such 
support. For example, when judging it irrational for S to believe that p, it clearly suffices 
as non-normative support to judge that S believes some other propositions inconsistent with 
p. (Steglich-Peterson, 2011 p. 335, emphasis original) 
Some clarifications are needed so as to make this objection non-question begging (Steglich-
Peterson 2011, pp. 343-44). There is no denying that normative judgments can ground other normative 
judgments. As Laurier (2011) points out, the judgment that I ought to open the window can be grounded 
through the judgment that I ought to let some fresh air in (p. 328). But the grounding normative judgment 
cannot act as the sufficient ground. For one can again apply the Because Constraint and challenge this new 
judgment: Why should you let some fresh air in? Because, say, I can hardly breathe in here. The chain of 
the grounding judgments for normative judgments can include other normative judgments. However, 
ultimately, a non-normative ground is what ends this chain. And the Because Constraint does not require 
anything more than that (Zangwill 2017, pp. 323-24). What Steglich-Peterson points out is that, at least 
sometimes, PAAJs clearly provide a sufficient and self-standing ground for some obviously normative 
judgments, which are judgments of rationality (Steglich-Peterson 2011, p. 344). Therefore, given the 
Because Constraint, the PAAJs cannot be normative. 
Analogously, Zangwill (2005) points to this in terms of what he calls the problem of “explanatory 
priority” (P. 7). According to this problem, we tend to explain the rational norms in force for a subject, i.e., 
what she ought to infer and do, in terms of her PAs, not the other way around. In other words, PAs explain 
the rational requirements (permissions) governing our thinking and action and it does not make any sense 
to claim that we have a specific PA because we ought to think and act in a specific way. Rather, we ought 
to think and act in a specific way because we have a specific PA. Therefore, PAs should not be regarded as 
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constituted by these norms since these norms are themselves explained by PAs. Added to the remark that 
these explanations are sufficient and given the Because Constraint, this shows that PAs should be conceived 
as non-normative states that ground the rational requirements (ibid). 
The next divergence between normative judgments and PAAJs concerns a priori normative 
supervenience. Although the intuition that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is pretty 
universal, it is not even close to that in the case of PAAJs (Zangwill 2005, p. 7). As Steglich-Peterson 
(2008) puts it: 
whereas the supervenience of the mental on the non-mental is known only a posteriori, the 
supervenience of the normative on the non-normative is analytic and known a priori. It is 
a conceptual truth about normative concepts that they are applied on the basis of non-
normative properties. But it is not a conceptual truth that the mental supervenes on the non-
mental, and one is not conceptually required to apply mental concepts only on the basis of 
non-mental properties … In other words, even if propositional attitudes in fact supervene 
on non-mental, non-normative properties, this is not an a priori truth that one would display 
conceptual incompetence in denying. (p. 274, emphasis original) 
The fact that PAs supervene on natural facts (particularly brain states) is almost an orthodoxy in 
the contemporary philosophy of mind. But few, if any, would claim that there is an a priori intuition behind 
that. No incoherence seems to follow if I do not have a specific belief or intention which I do in another 
situation identical in all non-normative respects. Millions of people, Zangwill (2010) says, believe that mind 
can survive the death of body or that mind supervenes on nothing other than itself. It is implausible to hold 
that all of these people are denying an a priori intuition about the mind (pp. 28-29), as they would be in 
rejecting the normative supervenience. This asymmetry, according to this line of thought, betrays the non-
normativity of PAAJs (Steglich-Peterson 2008, p. 274). 
Given all these, should we conclude, along with Zangwill and Steglich-Peterson, that PAAJs are 
non-normative? In the remaining sections, it is argued that it is so soon to succumb to these arguments. 
3. Attitudes as Commitments 
Conceiving propositional attitudes, particularly beliefs and intentions, as special kinds of 
commitments is a pretty recent idea in the literature put forward by a group of normativists. Although 
Wilfrid Sellars sometimes suggested this conception (see for example, Sellars 1967, p. 3), it was Robert 
Brandom (1994) who first worked out this idea in great detail in his magnum opus, Making it Explicit. Quite 
independently and with some differences, this idea has been defended by Isaac Levi (2002), Richard Moran 
(2001), Alan Millar (2004, 2009), Akeel Bilgrami (2004, 2006), Thomas Baldwin (2007), Annalisa Coliva 
(2016) and Nicholas Tebben (2018, 2019). Fortunately, the argument of this paper is not affected by the 
differences between these characterizations and works for all of them. However, for the sake of brevity, I 
focus on Brandom’s characterization of this thesis and just point to others when it helps to clarify the 
issues.10 
Commitment is in no way an unfamiliar category; in our ordinary life we are all familiar with such 
a notion. Promising is the paradigmatic case of undertaking a commitment towards somebody to fulfill 
something (Searle 1964, p. 45, Brandom 1994, pp. 163-65, Millar 2004, p. 72). Signing a contract is another 
 
10 Coliva (2016) and Tebben (2018) think that belief is ambiguous between commitments and internal psychological 
states. Brandom (1994) puts great emphasis on the social nature of commitments. But others think that the first-
personal perspective is more fundamental to commitments. 
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example of undertaking a commitment. By undertaking a commitment, a subject incurs a responsibility to 
live up to the commitment and authorizes others to count on this. Therefore, commitment is clearly a 
normative concept, in the sense that there is no way to specify commitments non-normatively.11 Brandom 
(1994) suggests we replace beliefs and intentions with doxastic and practical commitments respectively, 
which he collectively calls discursive commitments (p. 159).12 For him, commitments can do all the 
explanatory work expected from intentional states (ibid). 
It should be noted that different kinds of commitments may vary in what they make the subject 
committed to. In the case of promising, it is doing what one has promised that is the object of the 
commitment. What is it that the subject is committed to in having PAs? To start with, PAs are 
“commitments to think various things and to do various things” (Bilgrami, 2004, p. 128).  Discursive 
commitments, for Brandom, are inferentially articulated commitments, i.e., commitments to have other 
commitments determined by the inferential status of the object of the commitment. Entertaining a belief 
that P is undertaking a commitment to the truth of P. By undertaking this commitment a subject incurs the 
responsibility to defend P, when challenged, by providing reasons which are other commitments,13 and to 
be committed to the implications of this commitment. For example, by being committed to ‘it is red’, a 
subject becomes committed to ‘it is colored’ (this is what Brandom calls a “commitment-preserving 
inferential relation” (p. 168)), and she should be ready to defend this commitment, for example, by invoking 
her reliability in discerning the colors. Similarly, intentions are modeled as practical commitments to make 
something happen. Undertaking practical commitments is also inferentially articulated in terms of means-
end relations (I intend to go to the shop and getting on the bus is the only way available, so I have to get on 
the bus), and incompatibility relations (I should not be committed to read this book now, if I don’t know 
how to read) (Brandom, 1994, pp. 233-34). However, compared with promises, intentions are looser 
commitments in the sense that, unlike the case of promising, the subject can easily abandon them, usually 
without any criticism. But as long as she holds the intention, she ought to respect these obligations. As 
Millar (2004) puts it, “I can discharge this commitment in one of two ways: by doing the necessary, or by 
giving up the intention” (p. 75).  
In parallel with the normative category of commitment, Brandom puts forward the normative 
category of entitlement, by which he means permission or right. These are two primitive deontic statuses 
which are irreducible yet complementary: “Doing what one is committed to do is appropriate in one sense, 
while doing what one is entitled to do is appropriate in another” (Brandom, 1994, p. 159). Therefore, 
entitlement to one’s commitments is another normative dimension that opens up when we construe PAs as 
commitments. As mentioned above, vindicating one’s entitlement to beliefs (doxastic commitments), when 
properly challenged, is one of the responsibilities that a subject incurs when undertaking a doxastic 
 
11 That commitment, at least in the sense used here, is a normative concept is, I think, as obvious as the related 
concepts like responsibility, authority and entitlement are. I, therefore, take it for granted and do not argue for it 
here. However, as Millar (2004, p. 72) and Tebben (2019, p. 323) rightly point out there is a non-normative sense of 
commitment as well according to which being committed to something is being resolved, determined or dedicated 
to do something. It is clear that the sense drawn on in the attitude-as-commitment model is the normative sense. 
12 Brandom (1994) is clear that he does not intend to analyze or reduce beliefs to commitments. His proposal is to 
give up the belief-talk altogether and replace it with commitment-talk (p. 196). This further move is not, however, 
required for the arguments of this paper.  
13 This, of course, does not mean that we are under obligation to stubbornly defend our beliefs. What this means is 
that the subject is under obligation to be sensitive to the challenges leveled against her commitments. Sometimes 
it is by abandoning the commitment that this can be done. I suspect that Bilgrami (2004 , p. 137) has misunderstood 
the significance of this point. 
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commitment. Further, by undertaking a commitment a subject becomes entitled to many other commitments 
which may not be available to her beforehand. For example, by undertaking a commitment to ‘this is a dry 
match’, I become entitled to the commitment ‘this will light if struck’, even though I am not compelled to 
accept that (this is what Brandom calls an “entitlement-preserving inferential relation” (p. 168)). Given all 
these, Brandom defines two incompatible commitments as those in which commitment to one precludes 
entitlement to the other (p. 169). ‘It is red’ and ‘it is colorless’ are incompatible, since by undertaking the 
former a subject loses her entitlement to the latter. Of course one can have commitments to which one is 
not entitled: the dimension of entitlement disallows this, but does not make it impossible.14  
Commitments for Brandom cannot be separated from the practical attitudes of attributing and 
undertaking them. In fact, Brandom (1994) thinks that commitments are the creatures of the social practice 
of attributing/undertaking them (p. 161). Even if we deny this strong claim, it is still plausible that 
commitments are always accompanied by these practical attitudes. There are no free-floating commitments; 
they should be either undertaken or attributed to someone. 
What makes the commitment-model of beliefs unappealing to many is that it seems to contradict 
the widely held view known as doxastic involuntarism: according to this view, beliefs are involuntary in 
the sense that the subject does not decide to have them. In this sense, beliefs are obviously not like promises, 
intentions, and even assertions whose forming is clearly voluntary. And since beliefs are involuntary, the 
objector continues, they cannot incur responsibility; one cannot be deemed responsible for what one has no 
control over. Therefore, it does not make any sense to construe beliefs as commitments. This objection, 
however, misfires. True, doxastic commitments can be involuntary. I open my eyes and come to believe 
many things (to undertake doxastic commitments). Nevertheless, my responsibility now does not concern 
the formation of belief. Granted, I should not be responsible for something that I have no control over, but 
my responsibilities here do not concern this; rather, by coming to believe something, I incur a responsibility 
to follow the consequences of my beliefs and to defend the belief if challenged, namely if shown to be 
incompatible with my other commitments. If I cannot successfully defend the commitment, probably by 
abandoning the commitments incompatible with it or by showing that the challenge is not well-placed, I 
lose my entitlement to it and I should not undertake this commitment anymore. Therefore, even though 
unlike the cases of promising and signing a contract, doxastic commitments are not usually voluntary, this 
does not mean the responsibility dimension goes away. The involuntariness and the responsibility each 
concern different dimensions and, as such, do not undermine each other. In the case of promising, I am both 
responsible for making the promise and living up to it. But in the case of belief, it is holding the belief (not 
its formation) that my responsibility consists in.15 
It may seem that this view is nothing but another way to explicate the thesis that PAs are constituted 
by rational requirements and obligations. If this is so, then we will end up just where we started; PAAJs 
sufficiently explain the rational obligations and as such they should be non -normative judgments. 
Moreover, unlike evaluative and deontic judgments, PAAJs do not conceptually cry out for a metaphysical 
ground. Unfortunately, the defenders of this view have not done enough to dispel this thought. But the 
relationship between commitments and obligations is more subtle. Identifying these two normative 
 
14 Further to the intrapersonal dimension of commitments, which concerns one subject’s concomitant 
commitments, Brandom (1994) also puts forward the interpersonal dimension, which concerns the normative role 
that my assertion (expressing my belief) essentially plays for other people  (pp. 169-70). Interesting as it may be, this 
dimension does not concern us here. 
15 for a similar remark, see Baldwin 2007, p. 83. For a different strategy, see Tebben 2018. 
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categories makes us lose sight of the specific logic of the commitments, along with their 
undertaking/attribution. The next section tries to bring this important point home. 
4. Commitments and Obligations 
What is the relationship between commitment and obligation? To begin with, being committed to 
something is not identical with being obliged to do something. Rather, undertaking commitments explains 
the obligations that a subject becomes subject to. Unfortunately, even Brandom (1994) sometimes writes 
in a way that seems to urge the contrary. For him, commitments are just another way of speaking about 
obligations; a way that does not imply the hierarchical picture of obliging others implicit in the concept of 
obligation (p. 160). But this cannot be true; I should see my friend because I have promised him to do so, 
but it is not the case that I have promised to see him because I should see him. It is the same when we 
attribute a commitment to somebody else; that she is committed to P is not identical with the claim that she 
ought to P, even though this obligation conceptually stems from the commitment in question. Therefore, 
even though undertaking commitments essentially imposes some obligations on the subject, commitments 
cannot be identified with such obligations. There is a unidirectional path from commitments to the course 
of action that should be done as a result of undertaking them. Accordingly, if belief or intention is a specific 
kind of commitment, as suggested in the previous section, this does not mean that beliefs or intentions are 
a cluster of obligations or (rational) requirements imposed on the subject. Rather, they are commitments 
whose undertaking/attribution essentially enjoins some responsibility to comply with these obligations. 
Therefore, the rational norms essentially in force for PAs are responsibilities that a subject incurs as a result 
of undertaking these commitments. This point is analogous to Zangwill’s explanatory priority objection to 
conceiving PAs as normative states discussed in the previous section. Commitments explain the obligations, 
not the other way around. Therefore, these two cannot be identical.  
There is another related reason as well; obligations can be defined in terms of permissions. 
Brandom (1994) is right that doing so presupposes the formal notion of negation, but still this move is 
successful (p. 160). ‘I am obliged to do P’ can be defined as ‘I am not permitted not to  do P’. However, 
even with such a presupposition, commitments cannot be defined in terms of entitlements (rights, 
permissions). Brandom (1994) says that “It does make sense to think of being committed to do something 
as not being entitled not to do it” (ibid). But this cannot be right. It is true that I am not entitled not to x as 
a result of being committed to x; but it is clearly different from defining the commitment in terms of the 
entitlement. Intuitively, I may not be permitted not to x but still bear no commitment to x. But if I have 
undertaken a commitment (or am legitimately attributed one), I would not be entitled not to do it. This is 
not, however, a case of defining commitments in terms of entitlements. Rather, the consequent of this 
conditional holds because, as a result of undertaking a commitment, I come under an obligation to fulfill x, 
which now means that I would not be entitled not to do it.  
Notice that undertaking a commitment is not acknowledging an obligation either. I may not accept 
that I ought to stop smoking. But when I accept that, this still does not amount to undertaking a commitment 
to do so. There is an extra ingredient to undertaking a commitment. Obligations ensuing from commitments 
are, so to speak, self-imposed obligations (Liberman and Shroeder 2016); to be committed to stop smoking, 
I should have bounded myself to do so. This is not only acknowledging that a norm is in force for me, but 
also creating this norm ab initio.16 In this sense, Bilgrami (2006) seems right that there is an “agential” or 
 
16 One may object that undertaking a commitment is just thinking that one is obliged to do something, not that one 
is really obliged to do something. I think a little reflection will show that this is wrong; there is an obvious gap 
between thinking that one is obliged and being really obliged. However, undertaking a commitment is making 
oneself obliged, namely it creates an obligation (for a similar remark see Searle 1964, p.46). 
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“performative” aspect to commitments (p. 63). Commitments are specific to rational beings who can 
autonomously bound themselves and incur responsibilities. Therefore, only an agent or human subject can 
bear commitments. Finally, it is clear that undertaking a commitment does not mean that the subject will 
discharge it. The only link between undertaking a commitment and discharging it is that the subject should 
discharge the commitment that she has undertaken on pain of being criticized for her failure. The link, 
therefore, is itself normative through and through.17 
I conclude that despite their close connection, commitments should not be identified with 
obligations.18 By identifying commitments with obligations we lose sight of the distinguishing features of 
commitment-talk. The importance of these features will become salient in the next section when we see 
how commitment-attributing judgments differ from other normative judgments, including many obligation-
attributing judgments, with respect to the intuitions discussed in section 2.  
5. Commitments vs. the Intuitions 
Finally, let’s see how this normative account of PAs confronts the intuitions discussed in section 2. This 
section aims to show that when it comes to commitments, these intuitions do not even purport to hold. Let’s 
start with a priori normative supervenience. Interestingly, in a rather different context, Bilgrami (2006) has 
noticed that commitments, including PAs construed as such, are not subject to the a priori supervenience 
relation. As he puts it: 
two worlds may be exactly alike in descriptive facts but not in performative facts ... 
Supervenience is not a thesis that is made for, made to fit, the performative aspect of 
promising. Whatever it fits, it does not fit the performative aspect. That is exactly 
analogous to the point about the supervenience of values or of intentionality (thought of as 
values or commitments) on non-evaluative facts.19 (p. 63) 
Consider the idealized case of promising again. Suppose you have undertaken a commitment to 
somebody. Now, there seems to be no a priori pressure to concede that necessarily in a situation exactly 
alike this in all non-normative respects, you would have undertaken the same commitment or any 
commitment at all. Therefore, it seems that we have no intuition of supervenience of commitments on non-
normative facts, similar to what we lack in the case of PAs. No incoherence seems to follow if I have a 
different set of commitments in a situation exactly alike in all non-normative respects. At least when 
considered a priori, commitments seem to be independent with respect to non-normative facts, and the 
changes thereof. True, at least when it comes to doxastic commitments, having incompatible commitments 
(about a non-normative state of affairs) in non-normatively indiscernible situations can challenge the 
entitlement of the subject to those commitments. But this is different from supervenience and also holds for 
beliefs; having inconsistent beliefs (about a non-normative state of affairs) in two non-normatively 
indiscernible situations challenges the rationality of the beliefs. But it does not mean that beliefs supervene 
a priori on natural facts.  
How about the Because Constraint? Let’s start with the explanatory priority objection that Zangwill 
raised against PA normativism. The commitment-model of PAs behaves exactly similarly in this respect; I 
 
17 For a similar remark, see Steglich-Peterson, 2006, pp. 506-7. 
18 For an interesting discussion on commitment and its distinguishing features, see Shpall 2014.    
19 Notice that the kind of supervenience Bilgrami is appealing to here is global supervenience. Unlike weak 
supervenience which compares two situations in a single world, global supervenience concerns two distinct possible 
worlds. Therefore, global supervenience has a modal force which weak supervenience lacks. For a recent discussion 
of different kinds of supervenience and their implications for normativity, see Roberts 2018. 
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ought to infer such and such because I am committed to P. I ought to do such and such because I’ve 
promised you to do so. Therefore, the explanatory priority objection has nothing to tell against seeing PAs 
as commitments, even though it might be effective against other versions of normativism. This is so 
because, as we saw, commitments create and explain the obligations they impose. Further, commitment-
attributing judgments are sufficient for grounding judgments of rationality as well: it is irrational for you to 
be committed to Q because you are committed to P which is incompatible with it. Intuitively, these are 
sufficient explanations in the sense that nothing more is expected. Moreover, this goes beyond saying that 
commitments can sufficiently explain each other (as PAs can do); I am committed to P, because I am 
committed to P^Q. 
Finally, like PAAJs, attributing/undertaking commitments does not require non-normative 
grounding in the sense demanded by the Because Constraint (other than innocuous evidential support like 
expressions and behavioral clues). You are committed to P, because you have just said so, or you are 
behaving in a way that entitles such an attribution; these are epistemic reasons for attributing commitment, 
but it does not make any sense to claim that I am committed to P in virtue or because of a non-normative 
fact like behaving in a specific way.20 It is a priori that there should be something grounding why this car 
is damn good, like the fact that it is fast and cheap. But there is no such an a priori requirement for ‘Tom 
believes that P’ or ‘Tom is committed to P’. This is so because, as we saw in the previous section, 
commitments are special normative statuses that autonomous beings are capable of undertaking. 
Undertaking commitments is to bind oneself to a specific course of action, to make oneself responsible to 
do something. Commitments create obligations and nothing further to the fact that a commitment is 
undertaken is required to explain the obligations that the subject has incurred as a result of them.  
Even though these constraints do not govern commitments, it should not be concluded that 
commitments are worryingly ungrounded. Commitments can and should be challenged and reasons can 
always be asked for them. As already discussed, this is what the orthogonal dimension of entitlement 
provides for commitments. But commitment-attributing judgments do not hold in virtue or because of their 
entitlement. The relation between the commitments and their entitlement is not like the relation between 
the normative judgments and their grounding non-normative ones. I may be committed to something and, 
happily, I may have entitlement to it. But I also may be committed to something without being entitled to 
it, in which case I ought to revise my commitment. 
As should be clear by now, as well as the commitment-attributing judgments which are not subject 
to the constraints, some normative judgments stemming from commitment-attributing judgments are not 
governed by these constraints either. We saw that deontic judgments stemming from commitments (e.g., 
you ought to see me because you have promised me to do so) can be sufficiently grounded through 
commitment-attributing judgments which are normative judgments. Therefore, the Because Constraint does 
 
20 We say that I am committed to this because I have signed this contract. Isn’t it a grounding relation? I don’t think 
so. This explanation is more like I am committed to this because I have promised you to do so. Promising and signing 
documents are undertaking commitments, not non-normatively specifiable actions that enjoin commitments. 
Signing, contracting, agreement, and promising are all normatively-charged words presupposing the practice of 
undertaking and attributing commitments (Searle 1964, p. 56). When these actions are detached from this practice, 
for example once they are considered as depositing some ink on the end of a paper or making some noises, this 
illusion disappears. For the same reason, we should make sure that we are not including these normative respects 
into the supervenience base in thinking about non-normatively identical situations. I am committed to P because I 
have signed this contract. Of course, in a non-normatively indistinguishable situation in which I have signed this 
contract, I would be committed to P. But this situation is not only non-normatively identical, but also has part of the 
normative properties of the first situation. So it cannot show that commitments supervene. 
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not apply to this group of normative judgments either. If we have axiological (evaluative) judgments that 
can be grounded through commitment-attributing judgments, they also will be exceptions to these 
constraints. Suppose that I violate a commitment that I have made to you which you have counted on 
wholeheartedly, say that I will come to the cinema with you. This action, namely not coming to the cinema 
with you, is bad because it violates the commitment that I have undertaken toward you. Various non-
normative facts can contribute to the degree of badness of this action—if, for example, counting on my 
commitment, you have prepared many things which will be ruined by my violating my commitment. 
Despite this, the fact that this action is bad requires no more grounding than that it is a breaking of my 
commitment. And this sufficient ground is normative through and through. 
It might be tempting to think that something more is needed here. Why is this action a violation of 
my commitment? Because it is (or implies) my not coming to the cinema. So, perhaps it is this ‘not coming 
to the cinema’ in virtue of which this action is wrong. But I contend that we should resist such a temptation. 
Coming/not coming to the cinema specifies the condition of fulfillment/transgression of the commitment 
undertaken. It is clear that no commitment can be made unless its conditions of fulfillment are, at least 
implicitly, specified. Moreover, the conditions of fulfillment can, for sure, be expressed using non-
normative judgments. But we should note that these non-normative judgments just show why a specific 
commitment is fulfilled or violated, not why the commitment in question is undertaken or attributed or why 
violating the commitment is wrong. Conflating these two can lead us to think that these non-normative 
judgments are what the Because Constraint requires. Now consider again the judgment that your action in 
not coming to the cinema is bad. As I argued, this judgment can be sufficiently grounded through the fact 
that this action is against the commitment you have undertaken. You ought to do what you have committed 
to do and, therefore, it would be wrong not to fulfill your commitments. Granted, we can ask why this 
violates your commitment, and now you should invoke the non-normative judgment specifying the 
condition of fulfillment of the commitment undertaken.21 The non-transitivity from ‘this action is bad 
because it is against your commitment’ and ‘this action is against your commitment because it is your not 
coming to the cinema’ to ‘this action is bad because it is your not coming to the cinema’ is, I contend, a 
signal that the second sense of because is not what we have in the Because Constraint.22 This is bad only 
because it is a violating of my commitment. But it violates my commitment because it is (or implies) not 
coming to the cinema.  
 If this is right, then commitment-attributing judgments can sometimes sufficiently back up 
evaluative judgments regarding actions and states of affairs as well, just as they can back up certain 
requirements that apply to the subject. This shows that beside the commitment-attributing judgments, the 
Because Constraint should further be constrained to exclude those normative judgments (deontic or 
evaluative) that can be explained through them. Accordingly, these commitment-grounded judgments are 
 
21 Although I cannot fully defend it here, I think that institutional rules (like those in sports) are exceptions to these 
constraints too. Both Steglich-Peterson (2008, p. 275) and Zangwill (2017, p. 223) stress that the judgment that an 
action is foul in football should be grounded non-normatively, e.g., through the judgment that, say, ‘you touched 
the ball with your hand’, and this bears witness to the Because Constraint. But I think ‘it is a foul’ is sufficiently 
grounded through the judgment that ‘it is against the rule that the players have committed themselves to obeying 
by entering the game of football’. And ‘touching the ball with your hand’ is the condition of fulfilment/transgression 
of the rule, not what makes for any normative property. Of course the player can be (or pretend to be) ignorant 
about the rule that she has transgressed and, therefore, she can question this judgment. But this is not asking for 
the non-normative property or fact in virtue of which the action is wrong. The wrongness of this action presupposes 
this rule and cannot explain it. 
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not susceptible to supervenience either. For example, given an action that is bad because it violates your 
commitment and another action exactly alike in all non-normative respects, the second action might not be 
bad because there might be no commitment in play in the second case. Similarly, I ought to do something, 
because I have undertaken a commitment to do so. Now since commitments do not supervene a priori on 
non-normative properties, in a situation that is non-normatively indiscernible it does not follow a priori 
that I should have undertaken the same commitment, and therefore it does not follow that I ought to do the 
thing in question. 
I conclude that commitment-attributing judgments are as detached from these a priori constraints 
as PAAJs seem to be. So it is not bad news for PA normativists, at least in the version under consideration, 
that these constraints do not apply to PAAJs, since they also do not apply to commitment-attributing 
judgments which are normative through and through.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper argued that, despite their close connection, it is a mistake to identify the familiar 
normative category of commitment with obligations and requirements. When we respect the special logic 
of commitments, it becomes salient that commitment-attributing judgments, though indisputably 
normative, are not subject to certain robust intuitions governing other normative judgments. Therefore, it 
is just Wittgenstein’s one-sided diet which leads us to claim that these constraints hold for all normative 
judgments. These constraints should be constrained to exclude commitment-attributing judgments and 
those normative judgments stemming from them. One could yet dig in and insist that commitments are non-
normative because they are not subject to these constraints, but given that these constraints are themselves 
based on commonsense intuitions, this move does not seem plausible. Surprisingly, we saw that there is a 
version of PA normativism in which PAs are construed as specific kinds of commitments. We saw that the 
commitment-model of PAs is prima facie faithful to our intuitions regarding PAAJs as well as their 
divergences from other normative judgments. In view of this, the whole project of dividing PAAJ from 
normative judgment through these intuitions cannot get off the ground. Although this version of PA 
normativism is developed for quite independent considerations from those discussed here, the fact that this 
corresponds to the divergences that PAAJs show with respect to other normative judgments, lends it support 
over its rivals. Therefore, even though what Zangwill and Steglich-Peterson provides might have force 
against many versions of PA normativism, it has no bite against the attitude-as-commitment model. 
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